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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts at providing a survey of the different models of individual decision 
making within the household. The first section reviews the traditional approach to household 
decision making and emphasize its weaknesses. In addition to the standard assumption of 
selfish agents, other behavioral hypotheses --caring à la Becker and altruism-- are examined. 
This naturally leads to some economic justifications of marriage formation and dissolution. 
Based on these analytical building blocks, the second section proposes a typology of 
bargaining models of intrahousehold decision making. A first dividing line distinguishes 
cooperative and non-cooperative models. However, most of the models are based on 
cooperation amongst members of the household. While some of the cooperative models rest 
on a particular bargaining rule, such as the Nash-bargaining one, the collective approach, 
which appears to be more general, focuses on Pareto-efficiency without assuming a specific 
bargaining rule. The third section briefly raises two sets of methodological issues: one about 
the heuristic relevance of the intrahousehold decision models, and the second one relating to 
the empirical difficulty due to the lack of observable data. The conclusion stresses the 
potential of microsimulation models for enlightening these difficult, but crucial issues. 
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Introduction 
 
What difference does it make to individualize income taxation rules or social benefits, as 
opposed to splitting or pooling? Does it matter, and how, whether family and other personal 
circumstances are taken into account for calculating in-work benefits or tax credits? What are 
the likely consequences of each option in terms of personal income and welfare distribution, 
as opposed to households’ distribution? What is the incidence of each policy on children 
poverty? And what difference does make, if any, on labor force participation choices and 
labor supply decisions of individual members of the households? 
 
When it comes to tax reforms and welfare reforms, a large fraction of the policy debates in all 
European countries over the past two decades at least have focused on either these two types 
of consequences, which are indeed of utmost importance for tax and social policies: 
distributional effects and labor supply effects. Unfortunately, economists have for long been 
ill-equipped to tackle these issues, insofar as they have become accustomed to reason on 
households as if they were individuals, and to use household data likewise. Empirical studies 
of the supply and distributional effects of legislative changes have also, for the most, been 
conducted on this generic assumption, which may explain the difficulties encountered when it 
comes to evaluate the consequences of tax and welfare reforms. However, a new generation 
of models and analyses has blossomed over the past two decades, trying to tackle the issues 
raised by the understanding of individual choices and resource sharing within the household. 
 
Standard economic approach to tax and social policy issues derives the choices of the 
household from a single utility function. Individual preferences are then implicitly supposed 
to be aggregated into a set of preferences which characterizes the household, while resources 
are supposed be pooled. Family or household economics has developed new models in order 
to take the preferences of each household’s member into account. A large number of 
empirical work has emphasized the limits of the usual model. However, the new models are 
scattered and no theoretical framework has clearly taken over. 
 
Household choice patterns, public policies, the allocation of leisure and other resources within 
the family, labor force participation, are all closely related. As a consequence, focusing on the 
links between socio-fiscal policies and intrahousehold choices demands to analyze the 
hypotheses and the consequences of each model. These models are based on a collective 
bargaining household decision making or on the assumption that outcomes are Pareto-
efficient. A major issue is whether socio-fiscal policies exert an influence on households’ 
durability and stability. The answer depends on the framework which is chosen. Within 
intrahousehold bargaining models, a first dividing line contrasts cooperative bargaining 
games with non-cooperative games. Another distinguishing feature of these models is the type 
of sharing rule considered. The effects of socio-fiscal policies on intrahousehold choices 
depend on the hypotheses concerning household members’ behaviors as well: they may be 
egoistic or selfish, if they only take their own preferences into account, caring or altruistic; 
they can consider a budget constraint for each member, or pool resources.  
 
 
 2
1. General framework 
 
The bargaining models have been developed as an alternative to the usual approach of 
household decision making in order to specify particularly why there are marriages, how the 
household members make their choices, to what extent a marriage can be broken up. 
 
1.1. The traditional approach of household decision making 
 
The traditional approach to household decision-making (Samuelson, 1956) looks upon the 
household as a homogeneous group which shares identical preferences and pools wages and 
exogenous income. Within such a framework, the intrahousehold choices derive from the 
maximization of a unique function subject to a “pooling” budget constraint. The family 
behaves as if it was a single agent. 
 
Let us consider a two-member household, denoted (i,j). The utility of each member depends 
on one’s own consumption and leisure. As a consequence, the household is assumed to 
maximize a consensus welfare function, the expression of which is 
U(xi, li, xj, lj), 
subject to the joint budget constraint. The solution to this program yields goods’ demand 
functions and labor supplies. If the utility functions are well-behaved, these demand and labor 
supply functions depend only on prices and on total family income. 
 
Such a framework obviously does not allow taking the effects of a social or fiscal policy 
within the household into account. For instance, inasmuch as all income is pooled, what does 
it matter if a child allowance is paid to the father or to the mother? The answer is 
straightforward. The intrahousehold choices are independent of which member receives 
resources. Similarly, the intrahousehold choices are independent of which member consumes 
goods. What are the repercussions of an increase in one spouse’s wage on one’s own 
consumption and leisure? The increase could boost only one’s own consumption and leisure, 
while those of the other would remain unaltered, or both members’ consumption and leisure 
could go up. In the first case, the member whose wage increases would be egoistic, in the 
other case caring or altruistic. However, the usual approach of household is unable to provide 
a satisfactory answer because it does not consider the household decision making as that of a 
group: the household remains a ‘black box’. In fact, marriage “has been almost ignored by 
economists, although scarce resources are used and it has been followed in some form by 
practically all adults in every recorded society” (Becker, 1973). 
 
There are several problems and shortcomings with this approach. First, the assumption of 
common preferences which leads to the maximization of a single utility function is in conflict 
with methodological individualism. Second, this framework does not address such issues as 
the distribution within the household. Moreover, it ignores the question of household making 
and stability. 
 
1.2. Behavioral assumptions 
 
Standard microeconomics considers egoistic agents who aim to maximize their utility. Such 
an assumption may not be relevant when the economist focuses on intrahousehold choices. 
Since love is an important factor that explains marriage, the economist may have to take other 
behavioral hypotheses, such as caring and altruism, into account as well. 
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To begin with, an agent is said to be egoistic if she maximizes his or her own utility function, 
depending on her own consumption and leisure. Caring and altruism have to be distinguished, 
since caring rests on a sharing rule which is implicitly introduced by Becker (1974), whereas 
altruism is a more general behavioral assumption. An agent is said to be caring when her 
utility depends on the utility of the other members of the household as well as her own 
consumption and leisure. The “full caring” case will occur if an agent cares as much about the 
others as about herself. The agent who cares about the other members of her family will 
maximize her own utility function and transfer resources to the others. In fact, a household 
member is assumed to maximize a welfare index which takes her own egoistic utility and the 
utility of the others into account. This index as the following expression: 
Wi[Ui(xi, li, x0), Uj(xj, lj, x0)]  (1) 
(x0 is a public good). 
 
In contrast to the caring assumption, an altruistic agent will maximize her own utility 
function, which depends on her own consumption and leisure as well as on the others’. 
Preferences are then interdependent and there is at least one positive cross partial derivative2. 
 
Egoistic, caring or altruistic preferences and the nature of goods consumed by the household 
are not independent. If all goods are public, there is no difference between egoism and 
altruism. In the altruistic case, the distinction between public and private goods vanishes, 
since private goods provide utility for the whole family. 
 
1.3. Household formation and dissolution 
 
From the economic point of view, household formation by marriage occurs if and only if it 
increases the utility of both newlyweds. Similarly, marriage is broken up if both spouses 
could increase their utility outside the marriage. It appears that the marriage stability depends 
on what the spouses can find in and outside the marriage. 
 
If the preferences of the household’s members are egoistic, the economic explanation only 
takes strictly financial reasons for being married into account. 
? A first interest in marriage is based on the fact that there are economies of scales within 
the household. 
? A second interest lies in the fact that there probably are public goods within the 
household. That is goods that a member can consume without reducing the amount 
available to the other. 
 
Another set of justifications focuses on the fact that the spouses’ utilities are interdependent 
and is relevant to caring or altruistic preferences of the household’s members. 
? The household production --e.g., the quantity of meals, the quality and quantity of 
children, prestige, recreation, companionship, love, and health according to Becker 
(1973)-- provides another justification, on condition that household goods are not 
perfectly substitutable for market goods. 
? The household members can enjoy sharing leisure time. Togetherness is likely to increase 
each household member’s utility (Hamermesh, 2000). 
                                                          
2 Negative cross partial derivatives would mean that a member aim to improve her own consumption and leisure 
at the expense of the others’. Such a case may probably be excluded when focusing on families: it would be a 
dictatorial and strictly egoistic case. 
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The first set of justifications is not very broad insofar it does not actually take account of the 
taste or distaste of both household’s members for living together. Thus, it provides no 
convincing explanations for marriage formation and dissolution. That is why, for instance, 
Chiappori emphasizes that the collective approach he introduces with egoistic preferences can 
encompass caring preferences à la Becker (Chiappori, 1992). 
 
2. A typology of the intrahousehold decision models 
 
Intrahousehold decision models differ from the standard approach in two ways. On the one 
hand, each household’s member obviously has a utility function. On the second hand, leisure 
and goods consumption does not only depend on the total amount of resources available. The 
control of each spouse over resources is taken into account as well. Lundberg and Pollak 
(1993) stress the fact that “When the British child allowance system was changed in the mid-
1970s to make child benefits payable in cash to the mother, it was widely regarded as a 
redistribution of family income from men to women and was expected to be popular with 
women”. Intrahousehold decision models are meant to look into such questions. But no 
common framework stands out. 
 
2.1. Cooperative bargaining models 
 
As emphasized earlier, a first dividing line distinguishes cooperative and non-cooperative 
bargaining games. A priori, a household should behave cooperatively and cooperative 
bargaining games are indeed the leading framework to analyze intrahousehold choices. Notice 
that cooperation and egoistic preferences are compatible. Cooperation allows reaching 
equilibriums that are Pareto-efficient. However, an important matter relates to the stability of 
this cooperation. More precisely, to what extent can socio-fiscal policies alter the stability and 
durability of the cooperative equilibrium? 
 
To clarify this issue, it is helpful to introduce the concept of threat point. A threat point is the 
outcome that obtains if each household’s member has a non-cooperative behavior. In such a 
case, preferences are selfish and solutions usually are not Pareto-efficient. The current 
literature considers that this point corresponds to the utility that can be obtained by each 
household member outside the family or to a non-cooperative bargaining outcome within the 
household (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). 
 
In order to emphasize the effects of socio-fiscal policies on intrahousehold demand and labor 
supply decisions, attention will be focused on the threat point and on the shape of the budget 
constraint (e.g., joint budget constraint, separate constraints). It is indeed through both these 
channels that socio-fiscal policies ought to act upon intrahousehold choices. 
 
Whereas economics usually gives greater place to non-cooperative bargaining models, the 
analysis of intrahousehold choices focuses on cooperative games, i.e. on the formation of 
coalitions and on the distribution of the gains of cooperation among household members 
(Lundberg and Pollak, 1994). A common assumption of cooperative models is that 
equilibriums are Pareto-efficient. Cooperative bargaining models may be classified according 
the household’s decision process. However, all cooperative decision processes can be 
described in two steps. To begin with, agents share the total income between them. Then, 
each agent maximizes his or her own utility function (reflecting egoistic, caring or altruistic 
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preferences) subject to the joint budget constraint (Chiappori, 1988; Bourguignon, Browning, 
Chiappori and Lechène, 1991)  
 
Notations: 
T= total time available 
Uk is k’s utility 
wk is k’s wage rate 
Ik is k’s exogenous, non labor income 
Lk is time that k devotes to market work, and L=(Lk) 
X is a good vector and p is the associated price vector. 
 
2.11 Nash-equilibrium bargaining rule 
 
2.111. Divorce threat Nash-bargaining models 
 
Household choices derive from the maximization of the product of gains from living together. 
These gains are the differences between utilities inside and outside the marriage. As a 
consequence, the weight of preferences of each household’s member is therefore an 
increasing function of his or her threat point (McElroy, 1990). 
 
a. Nash bargaining rule, altruism and joint resources 
 
MacElroy and Horney (1981) stress the fact that a two-member household such as marriage is 
not different from two single persons on legal grounds. What matters is pooling resources and 
allocating them jointly. From such a viewpoint, altruistic or caring preferences become key 
elements of intrahousehold decision processes. 
 
Because a two-member household can be considered as a world with two agents (e.g., 
husband and wife), it is possible to use the Nash-bargaining rule within the family. A seminal 
model has been introduced by McElroy and Horney (1981). Let X=(x0,x1,x2,x3,x4) be a vector 
of goods consumed by the household, where x0 is a public good, x1 is a private market good 
consumed by the husband, x2 is a private market good consume by the wife, x3 is the quantity 
of leisure of the husband and x4 that of the wife. Labor supplies can be easily derived from 
leisure demands. Let P=(p1,p2,p3,p4) be the associated price vector. Each household member 
is assumed to be altruistic: the utility of the husband depends on his own consumption and 
leisure as well on his wife’s consumption and leisure, and reciprocally. As a consequence, the 
individual utility functions have the following shape, Um=Um(X) and Uf=Uf(X), are strictly 
quasi-concave, monotone increasing in all their arguments and have continuous, second 
partial derivatives. Outside marriage, each person would maximize his or her how utility 
function, Um=Um(x0m,x1,x3) and Uf=Uf(x0f,x2,x4) respectively, subject to the following 
constraint, Im+p3(T-x3)=p0x0m+p1x1 for the husband and If+p4(T-x4)=p0x0f+p2x2  for the wife 
(where x0m+x0f=x0). The maximum utility level (V0m and V0f) that each household member can 
reach outside the family depends thus on the prices of the goods he or she consumes, on his or 
her wage and on his or her exogenous income. Opportunities outside marriage can alter this 
level as well. V0m and V0f define the threat points. Provided preferences are independent from 
the marital status, the gain from being married is the difference between the utility inside and 
outside the two-member household. If a Nash bargaining rule is considered, the household 
maximizes the product of the individual gains from marriage. In other words, X is determined 
as 
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X
Arg max [(Um − V0m ).(Uf − V0f )]
   (2) 
subject to the joint income constraint and the time restraint. This program yields demands for 
goods and labor supplies taking intrahousehold bargaining into account.  
 
As this setting is based on an altruistic behavioral assumption, it is in fact not relevant to 
distinguish public and private goods. Moreover, this model describes an economy with two 
individuals and five goods. It appears that the Nash bargaining rule is only one of many rules. 
Pareto-efficiency is here a consequence of the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1953). A more 
general case would look upon Pareto-efficiency as an assumption without accepting a 
particular bargaining rule (Chiappori, 1988a and 1988b). However, the description of the 
interactions between the household’s members is then less accurate. 
 
b. Nash-bargaining rule, egoistic preferences and joint resources 
 
One of the models introduced by Manser and Brown (1980) is based on the Nash bargaining 
rule. The utility of an agent depends on the consumption of a public good, of private goods 
consumed by himself or herself and on an “efficiency parameter” αi which takes account of 
his or her taste or distaste for the other members of his family. For instance, if he or she feels 
distaste for living with the other members, his or her utility will be reduced. The shape of the 
utility function is thus: 
U(x0, xi, li, αi)   (3) 
On the condition that the efficiency parameter stands for xj and lj, preferences are altruistic 
and this framework coincides with the previous model (McElroy and Horney, 1981). In other 
cases, agents are assumed to be egoistic, since the efficiency parameter describes their own 
taste or distaste for living with the household’s other members. A household is assumed to 
pool resources. As a consequence, X and L are determined as 
X,L
Arg max (Um − V0m ).(Uf − V0f)
 (4) 
subject to the joint income constraint and the time restraint. V0m and V0f are the threat points, 
which correspond to the household’s members’ utility outside the marriage. This program 
yields good demands and labor supplies taking account of intrahousehold bargaining. 
 
2.112. Modeling the threat point within marriage 
 
The first model introduced by Lundberg and Pollak (1993) offers a straightforward way of 
modeling the threat point as a non-cooperative bargaining equilibrium within the household. 
 
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney’s (1981) seminal contributions assume 
divorce to be the threat point. The threat point is defined as the maximum utility that a 
household’s member can reach outside the marriage. On the contrary, Lundberg and Pollak 
focus on a definition of the threat point within the household. In this setting, the threat point 
corresponds to a non-cooperative equilibrium reflecting traditional gender roles and gender 
role expectations. This non-cooperative equilibrium based on gender roles can be the outcome 
on the grounds of transaction costs: if the dissolution of marriage has a significant cost, the 
spouses may prefer a threat point within the household. As a consequence, the final 
equilibrium is likely not to be Pareto-efficient. 
 
The threat point is given by a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium within the 
household. Moreover, Lundberg and Pollak stress the idea that “specialization by gender is a 
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pervasive aspect of family life” (p. 993). The Cournot-Nash equilibrium is assumed to 
correspond to a “gender specialization”: each member will provide goods that reflect his or 
her responsibilities within the family and adopt a labor supply according a division of labor 
based on recognized gender roles. For instance, the mother could provide goods that are 
necessary to children. In a more particular case, each household public good will be provided 
by one member of the household only. This member will therefore control the amount of this 
public good consumed within the household. This equilibrium is the “separate spheres” 
equilibrium within the family. Let us consider utility functions depending on private goods (xh 
and xf) and on two public goods (x01 and x02) jointly consumed within the household. 
Preferences are thus egoistic. Considering q02 as given the husband will choose xh and q01, the 
amount of x01 consumed by the household, to maximize his own utility function subject to his 
own exogenous income restraint. Similarly, considering q01 as given the wife will choose xf 
and q02 to maximize her own utility function subject to her own exogenous income restraint. 
These decisions give a set of reaction functions: 
 
xh=fxh(p01,Ih,q02) ; q01=fq01(p01,Ih,q02) ; xf=fxf(p02,If,q01) ; q02=fq02(p02,If,q01), (5) 
 
where p01 and p02 are the prices of x01 and x02. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium corresponds to 
the intersection of the public good demand functions.  Within such a definition of the threat 
point, the indirect utility functions depend on p1, p2, Ih and Iw. The threat points (θh and θf) are 
thus defined as depending on p1, p2, Ih and Iw as well, and the Nash welfare social function 
maximized by the household in case of cooperation is: 
 
N = (Uh– θh).(Uf– θf ).  (6) 
 
The non-cooperative equilibrium emerges if the gains from cooperation are lower than the 
cost of breaking up the marriage. It is important to notice that social policy as a child 
allowance can alter the threat point and the cooperative equilibrium, even if such a social 
policy would not modify the threat point defined as the indirect utility outside the family. 
Lundberg and Pollak’s contribution emphasizes that the effects of a social polity change with 
the way of modeling the threat point. 
 
2.12. Predetermined sharing rule 
 
Pareto-efficiency is likely to characterize most of the models which are developed. A set of 
intrafamily models follows a path which focuses on Pareto-efficiency without assuming a 
bargaining rule.  
 
a. The “collective approach” (Chiappori, 1988 and 1992) 
 
Let us consider a two-member household and focus on both household’s labor supplies. There 
is a unique private consumption good, whose price is normalized to 1. C refers to the total 
household consumption and C = Cm+Cf, where Ck is k’s personal consumption Assume that 
Cm and Cf are not observable, that is that only C is known. Whereas in the traditional 
framework, the household would maximize a single utility function subject to the following 
joint budget constraint  
 
C ≤ y + wm Lm + wf Lf  (7) 
where y is the non labor income and wm and wf are the wage rates, in the collective approach, 
the household is characterized by a pair of utility functions, assumed to be strictly monotonic, 
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strongly quasi-concave and continuously twice differentiable. Attention is focused on egoistic 
preferences. The Pareto-efficiency assumption leads to the following program. 
Max Um(Lm,Cm) (8) 
subject to Uf(Lf,Cf) ≥ uf and to the joint budget constraint (7), for some utility level uf. 
 
This program can be interpreted as a two-stage process: to begin with, the household’s 
members divide the total exogenous income, according to a predetermined sharing-rule; then, 
each member maximizes his or her own utility function. 
 
Non labor income is assumed to be shared according to a sharing rule φ, that depends on the 
given wage rates and on non labor income. According to the sharing rule, m gets a share φ(wm, 
wf, y), while f gets 1 – φ(wm, wf, y). Each household chooses his or her consumption and 
leisure –hence also labor supply—subject to his or her own budget constraint. For instance, 
m’s program consists in maximizing his utility function subject to 
 
wm(T–Lm) + Cm ≤ wmT + φ(wm, wf, y)  (9) 
 
and similarly for f. Chiappori shows that there exists a sharing rule φ such that Lm and Lf , the 
corresponding pair of labor supply functions, are solutions to m’s and f’s programs and are 
collectively rational. 
 
The “collective approach” provides a more general setting, since the sharing rule is 
predetermined. The only assumption is that outcomes are Pareto-efficient. The following 
paragraph gives an illustration of this approach. 
 
b. A model of choices with agricultural production 
 
Udry (1996) presents a model of household taking account of agricultural production by the 
family. Let us consider a two-member household and an economy with K private goods. C is 
the vector of good consumption within the household. Cf and Cm are the quantities consumed 
by each member respectively, so that C = Cf + Cm. Lf and Lm are the labor supplies and Z 
refers to the consumption of public goods within the household. As a consequence, if 
preferences are altruistic, Ui(Cf,Cm,Z,Lf,Lm) is i’s utility function (i={f,m}). The household 
produces at least some of the K private goods. Aj is the area of the j-th plot and Pk refers to the 
areas devoted to k-th good production. In this setting, the production of good k within the 
household is 
Yk = ∑ Gk (Lfj, Lmj, Aj)  (10), 
where Lfj and Lmj are the time devoted by each household’s members to produce the j-th good. 
Public good production within the household is 
Z = Z(LfZ, LmZ )   (11). 
Since Udry focuses on Burkina Faso villages, there is no labor market and 
Nf = ∑ Nfj + NfZ  (12) 
and Nm = ∑ Nmj + NmZ  (13). 
 
If P is the price vector, the budget constraint is 
P.C ≤ P.Y   (14) 
where Y is the household’s production vector. Therefore, a Pareto-efficient allocation solves 
for some λ: 
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subject to (10)-(14). 
 
2.2. Non-cooperative bargaining models 
 
Cooperative intrahousehold bargaining models raise some difficulties. Lundberg and Pollak 
(1994) stress the fact that “cooperative game theory begins by assuming that players can 
communicate freely and make binding, costlessly enforceable agreements”. Such external 
agreements, which would enforce the allocation within the household to be optimal, do not 
exist. For instance, in the Nash cooperative bargaining setting, the household is assumed to 
maximized the product of both household’s members’ gains from being married. However, 
the reason why the members should respect this program is disposed of and the stability of the 
solution is not guaranteed, since each player within the household could turn off course 
(Bourguignon, 1984). Of course cooperation seems to be obvious when focussing on family. 
In a repeated game nevertheless, non-cooperative behaviors could occur if the household’s 
members had divergent interests that they failed to reconcile. 
 
2.21. Non-cooperative decision making and labor supplies 
 
Few non-cooperative bargaining models of allocation within the household have been 
developed. Bourguignon’s seminal contribution focuses on labor supplies within a two-
member household (Bourguignon, 1984). The preferences of the household’s members are 
egoistic and are defined over their own leisure and consumption. The amount of goods 
consumed by each member depends on a sharing rule taking account of wages, labor time and 
exogenous resources. The interest of being married rests on some economies of scale and on 
some public goods consumed within the household. The non-cooperative solution leads here 
to a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. As a consequence, each household member is assumed to 
maximize his or her own utility function subject to the joint budget constraint and to the time 
constraint given the behavior of the other member. Both members’ reaction functions are 
derived from this program and the final outcome corresponds to their intersection. 
 
2.22. Non-cooperative bargaining decisions and voluntary contributions of public goods 
within the family 
 
Let us consider a simple repeated game with a single household public good (Lundberg and 
Pollak, 1994). Each spouse can contribute to the supply of this public good. Marriage cannot 
be broken up and the spouses are assumed to maximize their discounted values of infinite 
streams of utilities. Moreover, the spouses are assumed not to discount the future too much. 
Preferences are egoistic, so that utility functions depend on the amount of public and private 
goods consumed by each member. Both spouses decide simultaneously to what extent they 
aim to contribute to the public good purchase. Lundberg and Pollak stress the fact that “in the 
repeated game, the voluntary contribution game is a “stage game” played in each period, for 
ever”. There is no borrowing or saving.  
 
In the one-shot game, the Cournot-Nash equilibrium corresponds to the intersection of the 
public goods reaction functions. As a consequence, each member maximizes his or her own 
utility function subject to his or her own private budget restraint depending on his or her 
exogenous resources and considering the voluntary contribution of the other member as 
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given. The reactions functions derive from this program. The equilibrium is not Pareto-
efficient. 
 
In this repeated game however, other equilibriums are possible. Since each spouse can punish 
the other, a Pareto-efficient equilibrium may be reached (Folk theorem). The “punishment 
points” are defined as the security levels each spouses would achieve if the other refused to 
contribute to the public good. A social policy can alter these punishment points in favor of 
one spouse. For instance, “A redistribution of resources from husband to wife shifts the set of 
equilibriums in favor of the wife in the sense that, if the equilibrium were chosen randomly 
from this set, then the expected utility of wives would be higher and the expected utility of 
husbands lower” (Lundberg and Pollak, 1994, p. 135). The punishment is based on lower 
contribution to the public good. 
 
Non-cooperative bargaining models follow another path to look into the effects of social 
policies upon the household decision making. Control over resources become essential. The 
separate-spheres bargaining model aim to take account of non-cooperative bargaining models 
by defining the threat point inside marriage. 
 
3. Some methodological issues 
 
Two sets of methodological issues seem worth stressing. The first one concerns the heuristic 
relevance of the intrahousehold decision models. A good theory of intrahousehold choices 
must indeed satisfy a number of requirements including: testability, integrability, and 
minimum limitation of the assumption on the decision process occurring within the 
household. The second methodological point is linked to an empirical difficulty: since the 
distribution of the consumption within the household cannot generally be observed, a good 
theory should provide some way of recovering it from observable data. 
 
3.1. Heuristic relevance of the intrahousehold decision models 
 
The traditional approach deals with the household decision-making as that of a single person. 
If empirical evidences can highlight the weaknesses of this approach, they do not provide a 
proof of the heuristic relevance of alternative approaches. In the traditional approach, demand 
functions generated by rational preferences have to satisfy three requirements: homogeneity 
of degree zero; Walras’ law; substitution matrix ( )wpS ,  that is symmetric and negative semi-
definite at all ( )wp, , where p is the price vector and w the wealth. In other words, the 
traditional approach generates testable restrictions. The reverse question (integrability 
problem) is about recovering structural components from observed behavior. For instance, if 
we observe a demand function that satisfies the previous testable restrictions, is it possible to 
find preferences that rationalize it? Notice that integrability is a stronger requirement than 
identifiability, since two different functional forms can lead to a same structural form 
(Bourguignon, 1984). Testability and integrability requirements have to be satisfied by any 
alternative approach to household decision-making (Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1992).  
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3.11. Testability and integrability of the collective setting 
 
Our aim is just to underline the issues at stake. Testable restrictions concerning the collective 
approach are derived in Chiappori (1988a) in the case of household labor supply. This setting 
has been presented above. Let us consider 
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(on condition that the denominators differ from zero). Under some regularity assumption, it 
can be shown that any given pair of demand for leisure functions ( )fm LTLT −− ,  is solution 
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This set of conditions has to be checked for any pair of demand for leisure 
functions ( )fm LTLT −− ,  that is solution to the household members' programs. It provides a 
set of restrictions that labor functions have to satisfy and is therefore very important. That is 
why it can be interpreted as the analogue to Slutsky conditions within the collective 
framework. Such a set of restrictions can be derived from another viewpoint, focusing on 
revealed preferences. It is also possible, under some assumptions, to derive integrability 
condition, up to an additive constraint.  
 
3.12. Methodological issues concerning intrahousehold Nash-bargaining decision-making 
 
The use of the Nash-bargaining rule in order to describe the decision-making within the 
household raises important methodological issues. 
 
The tests presented by McElroy and Horney (1981) are in fact similar to the usual Slutsky 
restrictions: if these tests may disqualify the usual approach to household choices, they are 
not sufficient for basing another setting. That is why their use in order to base the Nash-
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bargaining model would be irrelevant. In fact, Chiappori (1988b) has shown that such a Nash-
bargaining model actually is not testable. 
 
The Nash-bargaining rule provides a precise way of modeling both household members’ 
behaviors: it leads to the maximization of the product of the gains to cooperation. This 
accuracy constitutes nevertheless a weakness, at least if no sociological data concerning the 
intrahousehold bargaining are available. Pareto-efficiency is a more general assumption. 
 
3.2. Recovering non-observable intrahousehold distribution of consumption 
 
In general, data concerning consumption within the household are not available. For the sake 
of simplicity, assume that each household member consumes only private goods and let 
fm C CC += be the household consumption, where Ck is each member’s personal 
consumption. C is often observable, contrary to Cm and Cf. Two definitions are useful to 
clarify the issue at stake: 
− A good is assignable if it is possible to observe the individual consumption of this good by 
each household member. 
− A good is said exclusive if it is consumed by only one person within the household. 
 
Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori and Lechène (1994) stress the fact that the distinction 
between assignable and exclusive goods is not always very clear when price variations are 
ruled out. For instance, are clothes assignable or exclusive? Within the collective setting, if an 
assignable good or two exclusive goods are observable, then the individual consumptions of 
the non-assignable goods can be recovered up to a constant (Chiappori, 1992; Bourguignon 
and Chiappori, 1992). Finally, the collective approach to intrahousehold choices has the 
advantage of satisfying (under precise conditions) the requirements stressed above and is 
therefore more capable of tackling reality. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was to survey the different models that have been developed as 
alternatives to the standard approach of household decision-making. A first dividing line 
distinguishes cooperative and non-cooperative games. Since marriage is assumed to rest on 
love, most of the models are based on cooperation between the household members. The 
weakness is that nothing is said about why the members should respect the program that 
determines their behavior. 
 
Some of the models based on cooperation assume that the decisions within the household 
follow a particular rule, such as the Nash-bargaining one. On the contrary, the collective 
approach considers that the outcome is Pareto-efficient, without assuming a specific rule. This 
approach is therefore more general, even if the description of the interactions between the 
mates is perhaps less accurate. In particular, it does not shed any light on intrahousehold 
resource distribution, a major aspect in any policy-oriented analysis. 
 
The next step should be to investigate the links between intrahousehold choices and socio-
fiscal policies, both from a distributional and from a labor-supply point of view. Insofar as 
they are based on micro (household) data and explicitly model the rules of the tax-benefit 
systems, microsimulation models may offer a convenient tool to evaluate these consequences 
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of public policies on individual resources and decisions3. By assuming a sharing rule, it is 
possible to investigate the distributional effects of national tax-benefit systems and to 
compare them, as exemplified in Orsini and Spadaro (2004). A complementary analysis 
would be to use simple assumptions in order to recover marginal effective tax rates for 
individuals within the households, and to evaluate the way they are affected by the tax-benefit 
system. 
 
                                                          
3 Other recent examples of analyses relying on microsimulation include Bargain (2005). 
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